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I. INTRODUCTION
This is a thesis concerning the possible impact of
creating a department head screen in the Naval Special
Warfare (NSW) officer community. At the present, U.S.
Navy unrestricted line (URL) officers of the same pay
grade but of all warfare skills are considered as a
single group for promotion purposes. Promotion selection
boards are tasked with the job of picking the "best"
officers for promotion to the next higher pay grade.
These selection decisions are not made with regard for
manpower requirements within specific URL subgroups or
communities. CRef. l: p. 10]
Fitness reports are the basis of promotion decisions
made by the selection board. In general, the Fitreps of
Naval Special Warfare officers are substantially higher
than personnel in other warfare specialties. This is due
to the unique opportunities that Naval Special Warfare
personnel are exposed to in the performance of their
duties that their URL peers are not. Since Vietnam,
Naval Special Warfare operations have become more strategic
in nature and tasking. SEAL Platoon Commanders,
Lieutenants (LT) and senior Lieutenant Junior Grades
(LTJG), are assigned to virtually independent duty,
representing Naval Special Warfare interests, often
reporting directly to Flag Officers and Commander in
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Chiefs. Relegating equivalent responsibility below the
rank of Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) in other URL
communities is an infrequent occurrence. Further, these
Platoon Commanders repeatedly cross train and participate
in major exercises with counterparts in NATO, SEATO, and
other allied nations. This provides a steady flow of
messages and letters of appreciation that are often
routed through embassy and State Department channels who
frequently add laudatory cover letters for jobs well
done. Additionally, Platoon Commanders are called on to
present demonstrations of operational capabilities for
various members of the executive and legislative branches,
and high level Department of Defense civilians. All of
these positive factors are incorporated in Fitreps, and
promotion boards have rewarded Naval Special Warfare
Officers accordingly. The net result of this has created
an excess of Lieutenant Commanders in the NSW rank pyramid.
Up to the current fiscal year (1985) this has not
been a problem for the Naval Special Warfare community.
Each unrestricted line community is "end strength" driven.
As long as an individual URL community does not expand
beyond its end strength the internal composition by rank
may exceed the number of authorized billets for each rank,
by using unfilled billets for a given rank from other URL
communities. However, when a community approaches its end
strength those pay grades with more personnel than
authorized billets must be decreased. The Naval Special
8
Warfare community is at this point. The proposed solution
is to institute a Department Head Screen in the NSW
community. [Ref. 2] This will limit the number of NSW
Lieutenants that will be able to fill department head
billets. Not being assigned a department head billet will
cause a greater number of Lieutenants to not be promoted to
LCDR and if properly balanced with accessions will bring
the number of NSW Lieutenant Commanders to within the
authorized number and then remain at a steady state.
The present effort, using a systems perspective, will
examine the size and structure of the Naval Special
Warfare officer community and project rank strength from
now thru 1991 using the Structured Accession Planning
System for Officers (STRAP-O). STRAP-0 is the model the
Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC) currently uses to
assess the feasibility of Navy officer manpower plans.
CRef. 3: p. 1] The proposal and the response to it bv NSW
community leaders will be examined in detail. Numbers
of officers by rank from STRAP-0 will be compared to
current rank strength and the effect by rank will be
shown. 0P-413D estimates forty percent by year group at
the Lieutenant level will be forced out of the NSW
community. Career alternatives currently open to personnel
in this 40% will be explored along with the effects on
readiness and accessions in the Naval Special Warfare
training pipeline and community.
It should be noted at the outset that the decision to
create a Department Head Screen in the Naval Special
Warfare Community was being debated throughout the writing
of this thesis. Some points of view quoted or referenced
were in a state of flux. Consequently, the final position
of some commands/ commanding officers may be diametrically
opposed to their original thoughts that are referenced
herein. Due to time constraints this regretable situation
was unavoidable. It is hoped the concerned commands
understand this. Every effort was made to present an
accurate picture of the subject with the information that.
was available at the time of writing.
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I I . BACKGROUND
This chapter presents the factors that form the
setting for this effort in three sections: First, the
Naval Special Warfare Officer Community as it is today;
Second, an examination of the Department Head Screen
proposal; Third, an explanation of the STRAP-0 model
and the reason it was used for this study.
A. NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE OFFICER COMMUNITY
Comprising less than 1% of the Unrestricted Line
(URL) community the Naval Special Warfare Officer Community
is rather unique compared to the other URL communities. A
discussion of the Naval Special Warfare mission and
community structure is relevant to understanding the type
of individuals that make up this community. In any
manpower decision affecting careers in the Naval Special
Warfare community it is important to keep this in mind.
The SEAL Team Mission Statement follows:
"Conduct unconventional warfare, counter - guer r i 1 1 a , and
clandestine operations in maritime areas and riverine
environments; This includes but is not limited to the
following: demolitions, intelligence collection, and
training and advising friendly military and paramilitary
forces in the conduct of naval special warfare. In
particular, SEAL Teams are tasked with maintaining the
capabi 1 i ty to
:
1. Destroy enemy shipping, harbor facilities, bridges,
railway lines, and other installations in maritime areas
and riverine environments.
2. Infiltrate and/ or exfiltrate agents, guerrillas,
evaders, and escapees.
3. Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and other
intelligence activities.
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4. Accomplish limited counter- insurgence civic action
tasks which are normally incidental to counter-guerrilla
operations; possibilities include medical ai d , e 1 ementary
civil engineering activities, boat operations and
maintenance, and' basic education of the indigenous
popu 1 at i on.
5. Reconnaissance and clearance of the area from the
3.5 fathom curve to the high water mark on a prospective
landing beach. Additional tasks include channel;
location, marking and improvement, and assault wave
gui dance.
6. Organize, train, assist, and advise the United
States, Allied, and other friendly military or
paramilitary forces in the conduct of any of the above
tasks." [Ref. 4: p. xiv]
This mission statement is a living document that
continues to evolve as new taskings are received and new
threats arise. This evolution is primarily driven by new
technologies and new political situations.
While the general population has stereotyped the kind
of individuals that voluntarily engage in this occupation
as reckless and aggressive, research evidence suggests
that team members are likely to be supportive of their
superiors, have high emotional stability, are not
aggressive, are outwardly friendly, are highly motivated
in their work and in group efforts, and are not adverse
to stressful situations. [Ref. 5: p. 8]
1 . Naval Special Warfare Commands
The commands that make up the Naval Special
Warfare community are shown in Figure 1. The Naval
Special Warfare Groups and Units (NSWG's & NSWU's),
Special Boat Squadrons and Units (SBR's & SBU's), and
Naval Special Warfare Training Department (NSWTD) all have
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Fi gure 1 .
Naval Special Warfare Commands
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Special Warfare mission. The SBR's actually have three
primary Naval Special Warfare missions: SEAL insertion/
extraction support, Riverine Warfare, and Coastal Patrol
and Interdiction (CP & I). It accomplishes this three
part task with an assortment of specialized craft; 36-foot
Seafox Special Warfare Craft-Light (SWCL), Mini-Armored
Troop Carriers (ATC), rehulled River Patrol Boats (PBR),
and 65-foot MK-III Sea Spectre Patrol Boats (PB). CRef. 6:
pp. 140,141] Due to the complexity of these platforms and
their attendant propulsion and weapons systems officer
billets in the SBR's and SBU's are jointly filled with
Naval Special Warfare and Surface Warfare Officers. The
significance of this will be seen in section III.
14
Naval Special Warfare Officer Billets
TABLE 1.
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMUNITY
RANK INV OVER %OVER BILT PBILT %INC TOTAL
0-7 1 0% 1 0% 1
0-6 15 6 67% 9 5 56% 14
0-5 41 3 8% 38 4 11% 42
0-4 87 35 67% 52 7 13% 59
0-3 115 14 12% 101 69 68% 170
0-2 52 12 23% 84 47 56% 131
0-1 44 - - - - - -
TOTAL 355" 70 25% 285 132 46% 417
INV = Current inventory
OVER = Current # of personnel over a! 1 owance
%OVER = Current % of personnel over allowance
BILT = Current # of authorized billets
PBILT = Profected billet increase FY86-FY90
%INC = % of billet increase
TOTAL = Total billets in FY90
« There are 34 non 1130 billets with 1130's assigned
that are not counted against the Naval Special Warfare
allowance of 285. Therefore, the community appears as
321. [Ref. 7]
The important facts to note from Table 1 are:
The 0-4 level is 67% overmanned now; The number of 0-4
level billets will increase by only 13% thru 1990; The
number of 0-1 & 0-2 level billets will increase by 56%;
The number of 0-3 level bi 1 lets wi 1 1 increase by 68%.
If the promotion system continues at its current rate the
problem will increase.
3. Current Naval Special Warfare Career Path
A Department Head Screen can be seen in the
current Naval Special Warfare career path shown in Figure
2. However, the term Department Head is a misnomer
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in this instance. This tour is an Operations Officer tour
in any one of the Teams, and although desireable for
promotion, it is not mandatory. Assignment to one of these
billets is on a first come first serve basis and is decided
by the Naval Special Warfare Detailer/ Placement Officer.
The billets are filled by senior Lieutenants and junior
Lieutenant Commanders. Due to the small size of the Naval
Special Warfare community both detailing and placement are
performed by one individual. Executive Officer (XO)
billets are filled by Lieutenant Commanders and Commanding
Officer billets are filled by Commanders. Table 2 gives
the current Department Head, Executive Officer, and
Commanding Officer billets available to the Naval Special
Warfare Community.
Since 1979 aspiring Naval Special Warfare officers
in Year Group (YG) 1970 or junior have been advised to get
as much operational (Platoon Commander) experience as
possible, develop a subspecialty early, keep in the top 1%
on Fitreps, and serve in an operations bil let prior
to screening for XO. [Ref. 93
B. THE DEPARTMENT HEAD SCREEN PROPOSAL
The idea is to start, in the March 1986 ARS/ATS XO
screening board for year groups 78-80, a Naval Special
Warfare Department Head Screen. This initiative will
modify the Naval Special Warfare career path and community
structure. Each Lieutenant will be screened at the six.
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CURRENT DEPARTMENT HEAD, XO, CO BILLETS
Lieutenant Department Head Billets (18 Month Tours):
8 SDV/ SEAL Team Operations Officers
3 NSWU Operations Officers
3 NSWTD Department Heads
14 Billets/1.5 yr = 9.3 Bill ets/yr = 49% opportunity
19 pers/YG
Lieutenant Commander CO/XO Billets (18 Month Tours):
8 SDV/ SEAL Team Executive Officers
3 SBU Commanding Officers (1)
3 NSWU Executive Officers
14 Billets/1.5 yr = 9.3 Bill ets/yr = 93% opportunity
10 pers/YG
Commander CO Billets (27 Month Tours):
7 SDV/ SEAL Team Commanding Officers (2)
1 SBU Commanding Officer
3 NSWU Commanding Officers
11 Billets/2.25 yr = 4. 8 Bill ets/yr = 98% Opportunity
5 pers/YG
Captain Major Command Billets (24 Month Tours):
2 NSWG Commodores
2 Billets/2 yr = 1 Bill et/yr = 33% Opportunity (3)
3 pers/YG
Notes : (1) An XO tour.
(2) Does not include SEAL Team 6.
(3) Opportunities based on Year Group ( YG ) size
which is based on historical attrition rates
and promotion opportunities. [Ref. 10]
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screened the Lieutenant will be assigned to a Department
Head billet at the first opportunity. If the Lieutenant
does not pass the screen he will be advised to remain
operational and rescreen the following year. If the screen
is failed three times the Lieutenant will not be
competitive for advancement and would be advised to leave
the service. Figure 3 depicts the proposed Naval Special
Warfare career path.
Included in the main proposal is a second initiative
to increase the current number of Naval Special Warfare
CO/XO and Department Head billets by restructuring the
Special Boat Units of each coast by making the Commanding
Officer billets 1130 Lieutenant Commanders and the SBU
Executive Officers 1130 Lieutenants. Table 3 is a list
of the proposed billets based on the anticipated FY 1990
billet structure shown in Table 4.
C. THE STRUCTURED ACCESSION PLANNING SYSTEM FOR OFFICERS
The Structured Accession Planning System for Officers
(STRAP-0) model was selected for this projection with the
goal of confirming NMPC-413D's estimate. This estimate
was arrived at through unique calculations based on
information provided to NMPC-413D by NMPC-413. Other
models could have been chosen, but due to the lack of data
on, and not knowing the relationship between, all of the
interrelated variables using a model other than STRAP-0
could produce results with little or no cred i tab i 1 i ty . On
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SENIOR TOURS
24--! Major Shore Staffs Major Shore Command
Subspecialty Utilization
22--! ADVANCED OPERATIONAL TOURS (4)
NSWG Commander Major UW Operational Staff
20--! THIRD SHORE/SENIOR OPERATIONAL TOURS
Command of NSWU/SBR/SEAL TM/SDV TM
18--! Major Shore Staff
Senior Service College
16--! Subspecialty Utilization (3)
SECOND SHORE/INTERMEDIATE OPERATIONAL TOURS
14--! NSW/UW/Navy/Joint Staff Billets
Postgraduate Schoo 1 / Juni or Service College
12--! Subspecialty Utilization
XO SEAL TM/SDV TM LCDR CO Billets (2)
10--! SECOND OPERATIONAL TOUR
Operations Officer SEAL TM/SDV TM/NSWTU
8--! Dept Head SBR/SBU/SDV/NSW/NSWTD
FIRST SHORE TOUR









FIRST OPERATIONAL TOURS (1)
Asst & Pit Commander SEAL and SDV TM
Special Boat Units
SEAL Training NSWTD
(1) NSW Department Head Screen years 6, 7, 8.
(2) XO Screen years 10-13.
(3) CO Screen years 15-18.
(4) Major Command Screen years 20-and on.
Fi gur e 3.
Proposed Naval Special Warfare Officer Professional
Development Path [Ref. 2]
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TABLE 3.
PROPOSED DEPARTMENT HEAD, XO, CO BILLETS
Lieutenant Department Head billets (21 Month Tours):
9 SDV/ SEAL Team Operations Officers (1)
3 NSWU Operations Officers
6 SBU Executive Officers (2)
6 SBU Operations Officers
2 SBR Chief of Staff Officers (2)
2 SBR Operations Officers
2 SDV Mater ia 1 /Mai ntenance Officers
3 NSWTD Department Heads
33 Billets/1.75 yr = 18. 8 Bi
1
lets/yr = 59% Opportunity
32 pers
Lieutenant Commander CO/XO Billets (18 Month Tours):
9 SDV/SEAL Team Executive Officers
6 SBU Commanding Officers (3)
3 NSWU Executive Officers
18 Billets/1.5 yr = 12 Bi
1
lets/yr = 46% Opportunity
26 pers
Commander CO Billets (27 Month Tours):
8 SDV/SEAL Team Commanding Officers (4)
2 SBR Commodores
3 NSWU Commanding Officers
13 Billets/2.25 yr = 5.7 Bi
1
lets/yr = 32% Opportunity
18 pers
Captain Major Command Billets (24 Month Tours):
2 NSWG Commodores
2 Billets/2 yr = 1 Bill et/yr = 11% Opportunity (5)
9 pers
Notes: (l) Includes SEAL Team 8, planned.
(2) A Department Head tour.
(3) An XO tour.
(4) Includes SEAL Team 8, doesn't include SEAL Team 6.
(5) Opportunities based on YG size which is based on




NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMUNITY FY 90
YOS RANK #/YG X #YRS = TOT/RANK BILLETS OVERAGE %OVERAGE
30
0-6 9 X 8 = 72 13 59 453%
20
0-5 18 X 8 = 144 42 102 243%
14
0-4 26 X 5 = 130 59 71 120%
9
0-3 32 X 5 = 160 170
4
0-2/1 36 X 4 = 144 131 13 10%
TOTAL 650 455 43%
Note: This is NMPC-413D's projection without the Naval
Special Warfare Department Head Screen. Year Group
size is based on historical attrition rates and
published promotion opportunity. CRe-f. 2]
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was designed to solve just this sort of problem, and all of
the actual data for the entire Navy Officer Corps is in the
STRAP-0 system. Finally, it's the model currently in use
by NMPC to assess the feasibility of Navy officer manpower
p 1 ans
.
The main purpose of STRAP-0 is to determine if a
desired force level of officers is feasible in terms of
expected or desired attrition, the number of accessions
required to achieve the specified force levels, the
available supply of officer candidates to support
accessions, the promotion and lateral transfer plans
required, pay grade limitations, the demands on the
training establishment, and the manpower overhead (student,
transients, patients, etc.) needed to sustain the force.
Figure 4 is a flow chart of the STRAP-0 model. CRef.3:
p. 2]
The following briefly describes the functions of the
primary modules that make up the STRAP-0 model:
OGOALS is a module that produces total strength and
specific grade goals from the same requirement set used
for AIDS. This ensures that both modules are driving
toward consistent targets. CRef. 3: p. 4]
AIDS is a linear goal programming model that determines
the optimal number of officers to access each year from
each commissioning source to achieve future force goals.
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Structured Accession Planning System for Officers
[Ref. 3: p. 2]
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OPRO, the force projection module, forecasts personnel
flow behavior of officers as they are gained or lost to the
system, promoted, or aged. It's a fractional flow model
with foresight. It anticipates vacancies and accesses or
promotes enough replacements to fill the vacated
positions. It forecasts and summarizes the personnel flows
in terms of continuation rates. These rates then become
inputs to AIDS. CRef. 3: p. 3]
ORFM, the officer retention forecasting module,
estimates the changes in compensation policies. The model
compares the officers expected life stream earnings from
the decision to remain in the military and the decision to
return to civilian life then relates the two earnings
streams to the current and historical loss rates. Estimates
of the future loss rates can then be made. [Ref. 3: p. 3]
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III. NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO PROPOSAL
The proposal was submitted by the Naval Special
Warfare Detailer/ Placement Officer (NMPC-413D) to the
Commanders of Naval Special Warfare Groups One and Two
for comments and recommendations. [Ref. 2] Based on
their input NMPC-413D will decide if the Department Head
Screen has sufficient support from the Naval Special
Warfare community to institute. If so, NMPC-413D will
request NMPC-413, the Surface Ship P 1 acement /Surf ace
Community Manager, to put the screen in the system.
Figure 5 shows the NMPC Officer distribution. Officer
community managers are also part of the Military Personnel
Policy Division in OPNAV, specifically 0P-130E. Community
managers perform numerous duties.
"Some of the matters which the community manager is
responsible for include monitoring the number of
accessions and the opportunity for augmentation/
lateral transfer; and overseeing promotion plans,
strength plans and career development. Career
development policies include: tour length; career
pattern; department head, XO, CO and major command
requirements and opportunity; training pipeline; and
other detailing policy." [Ref. 11: p. 4]
A. COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUP ONE RESPONSE
The Commander NSWG ONE solicited input from his
subordinate commands. Their response is incorporated in
the Commander NSWG ONE's letter to NMPC-413D. The
Commander NSWG ONE concurred with establishing a Naval
Special Warfare Department Head Screen, its timing
26
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(starting in March 1986), and made four recommendations:
(1) An additional Department Head billet for Officer in
Charge SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Team ONE
Detachment, Hawaii be included. CRef. .12]
(2) Delete SDV Material/ Maintenance Officer from the
Department Head billets. This position will be
filled with Limited Duty Officer (LDO) Lieutenants
(6130), a POM 86 fill. CRef. 12]
(3) Increase tour length for Lieutenant Commander
Commanding Officer billets to 24 months vice 18
months. CRef. 12]
(4) Hold in abeyance the decision to down grade all
Special Boat Squadron Command and Executive Officer
billets until further consideration has been
completed. CRef. 12]
B. COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUP TWO RESPONSE
The Commander Naval Special Warfare Group TWO rather
than submitting one letter on the subject submitted the
individual inputs received from each of his subordinate
Naval Special Warfare commands. The following items are
the individual command responses. They represent varied
points of view that range from qualified concurrence
CRef. 13] to vehement disagreement CRef. 14]. These
views contain the factors that the individual team
commanding officers considered in developing their
pos i t i ons
.
1 . SEAL Team TWO
The commanding officer vehemently disagreed with
starting a Department Head Screen for the following
reasons
:
(1) Some officers are slow starters. CRef. 14]
(2) Initial screening at six years would cause most
28
junior officers to shy away from First Shore Tour
(Figure 3) assignments. Staff, Postgraduate and PEP
tours that provide long term professional gains may
place the junior officer in a not-observed status on
their Fitreps. Only junior officers who screen at
first look could afford not-observed Fitreps.
Junior officers that did not successfully screen at
first look would be advised to log time in an
operational team and bring up their Fitreps.
This makes the First Shore Tour option false
advertising within the Naval Special Warfare
professional development path, particularly for the
officer that completes basic Naval Special Warfare
training at the Lieutenant level. [Ref. 14]
(3) It should be well within the detailers ability to
impartially and fairly pick which junior officers
get detailed to Department Head billets and thus,
perform the same function as a screening board
without limiting the flexibility for internal
command assignments. [Ref. 14]
(4) The Naval Special Warfare community is too smal 1 for
another board. It would limit detailing
f lexibi 1 ity. [Ref . 14]
(5) Tour lengths of 24-30 months were recommended aboard
specific command with fleet up to an Operations
Officer billet from Training Officer vice the 21
month tour, (Table 3), of the proposal. [Ref. 14]
(6) Naval Special Warfare Officer billet growth is
projected to be 465 in FY 90 vice 650 detracting
from the creditability of Table 4. [Ref. 14]
2. SEAL Team FOUR
The Commanding Officer felt it appeared to be a
sound start toward effectively managing the growing Naval
Special Warfare Officer Community. His thoughts on the
i ssue were
:
(1) Concurred with the proposed timing, and thought it
would encourage non-screeners to resign, which would
alleviate the overmanning projected in paygrades
0-4 and above. [Ref. 13]
(2) Weeding out 40% of each 0-3 level year group seemed
29
somewhat drastic. To increase the opportunity for
an 0-3 to get a Department Head billet including
SEAL and SDV Training Officer billets as Department
Head billets, and possibly SEAL Mater ia 1 /Maintenance
Officer billets, were recommended. [Ref. 13]
(3) Commanding Officer tours should be reduced to 24
months vice 27 months to raise commanding officer
assignment opportunity. [Ref. 13]
(4) Due to lack of billets, consider upgrading some
Staff billets to keep senior officers in the
community. [Ref. 13]
(5) Encourage sub-specialty development to divert excess
officers. [Ref. 13]
(6) What impact wil 1 the screen have on attrition?
[Ref. 13]
(7) Is 0P-01 supporting our officer accession (and
retention) requirements? [Ref. 13]
3. SEAL Team SIX
The Commanding Officer concurred with the
Department Head Screen proposal and had the following
comments
:
(1) The screening board should be conducted by senior
grade 0-5 and above 1130 officers. [Ref. 15]
(2) Screening should not disqualify the individual from
assignment to a leadership position (ie. Platoon
Commander). [Ref. 15]
(3) Platoon Commander assignments should be reserved for
proven leaders 0-3/0-4 in grade possibly following a
Department Head tour. Career planning should allow
an officer to serve as an Assistant Platoon
Commander, a Department Head, and then a Platoon
Commander. [Ref. 15]
(4) Recommended 15 to 18 month Department Head tour
lengths, vice the proposed 21 months, (Table 3), to
increase opportunity. [Ref. 15]
(5) Concurred with downgrading Special Boat Unit
Commanding Officer billets to 1130 0-4 and Special
Boat Unit Executive Officer billets to 0-3. However,
disagreed that the Executive Officer billet must be
30
an 1130 to capture fleet experience lacking in
1130's. CRef. 15]
4. Special Boat Squadron TWO
The Commander of SBR-2 felt there were flaws and
inequities that pertain to the Boat Squadrons, and they
were J
(1) With the exception of SEAL Team SIX, Special Boat
Unit-20 is the largest Naval Special Warfare Group
TWO operational command in terms of assigned capital
assets, and with the realization of the current FYDP
they will also have the largest inventory of
manpower. Based on the associated leadership,
fiscal, material, and managerial responsibilities of
that command, officer rank structure should at least
paral lei in seniority that of SEAL and SDV teams.
CRef. 163
(2) Approximately 40% of Special Boat Unit TWO assets
come under the Naval Reserve system, and TAR officer
expertise provides the interface to this system
which is alien to most USN officers. Without the
presence of TAR officers, the Squadron would not be
as effective or efficient as it is currently.
Potential for command of an Special Boat Unit is
undoubtedly the reason Special Boat Unit receives
top notch TAR officers. CRef. 16]
(3) Special Warfare Craft Medium Navy Technical
Projections (SWCM NTP) is aware that there will not
be enough 1130's by 1990 to man SWCM OIC/AOIC
billets. To gain surface warfare expertise those
billets will be programmed lllx. If there is no
career progression offered beyond OIC of an SWCM
those positions may be regarded as a dead end and
getting quality personnel will be a problem.
CRef. 16]
(4) Recommended that the Commanding Officer of Special
Boat Unit TWENTY be upgraded to Commander, Executive
Officer to Lieutenant Commander, and Operations to
Lieutenant Commander. Where Special Boat Unit is
within the chain of command should be deliberated in
the future. CRef. 16]
(5) Recommended that lllx billets (SWCM OIC/AOIC) at
Special Boat Unit TWENTY be filled in part by
1117's, TAR-SWO qualified, and that they be eligible
to return on a future tour to Special Boat Unit
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TWENTY-TWO or TWENTY-FOUR as Commanding Officer or
Executive Officer. Rotate those billets between
1130 and 1117. This would fill the SWCM program
with top surface qualified TAR' s who would have
future command potential (SBU 22/24) which would
provide incentive for top performance. CRef. 16]
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IV. THE STRAP-0 PROJECTION
As previously stated the Structured Accession Planning
System For Officers model was the analytical tool used to
confirm NMPC-413D' s projection of the Naval Special Warfare
Officer community with a Department Head Screen in the
career path at the 6, 7, and 8 year points. This required
the identification of inputs. (The reader is referred to
Chapter II. C. for an explanation of the STRAP-0 model.)
A. SETUP OF THE STRAP-0 MODEL
Since the number of Lieutenants advancing to Lieutenant
Commander will be directly proportional to the number of
Lieutenants passing the Department Head Screen, (i.e., an
implicit assumption in the use of the Department Head
Screen), the promotion rate at the 0-3 to 0-4 level
was controlled. Four STRAP-0 runs were made, one at
default, and three with the 0-3 to 0-4 promotion rates
controlled at 80%, 70%, and 60%. The latter, 60%, being
the pass rate NMPC-413D calculated to be necessary to
bring the number of Lieutenant Commanders to within the
number of authorized billets for Lieutenant Commanders
[Ref. 2]. The default run models the Naval Special
Warfare community without the Department Head Screen and
the 0-3 to 0-4 promotion is not controlled. Runs at 70%
and 80% were made to see what effect a less drastic
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no-pass rate would have on the Naval Special Warfare
communi ty
.
STRAP-O, if accessions are not controlled,- will
output the number of accessions required to maintain the
various communities at their authorized billet levels.
The Naval Special Warfare accessions were controlled with
the "best estimate" which is the number of accessions in
the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). It was assumed these
numbers are very close to what will actually occur. Like
all strengths in the FYDP, Naval Special Warfare accessions
are subject to change. However, the amount of variance
is unlikely to be significant based on past experience
[Ref. 17]. This forces the assumption that the Department
Head Screen wi 1 1 not have a negative effect on accessions.
On the three controlled runs STRAP-0 included 1985 as a
screening year so the results will appear more favorable to
the Department Head Screen proposal, but by less than 2%.
All other variables were run at the default settings,
and in the output data the Naval Special Warfare Department
Head Screen had no noticeable impact on any other part of
the system. This was expected due to the small relative
size of the Naval Special Warfare community to the overal 1
Navy Officer Corps (<.6%).
B. STRAP-0 OUTPUT
The output from STRAP-0 was four 121 page computer
printouts containing information on all URL communities.
Results relating to Naval Special Warfare were as follows:
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Table 5 shows total end strengths by grade for the Naval
Special Warfare community from 1985 thru 1991 for each run
along with the projected number of authorized billets, the
overage, and % overage. This table illustrates the 0-4
rank will be trimmed down to within 3% of the target
level. The target level is 0% overage, which is the
authorized number of billets. However, due to the small
size of the year groups, to actually hit the target level,
0%, would require decreasing the Department Head Screen
pass rate to 50%. The 50% is an extrapolation based on
trend from 95% (the default average) to 60%, a 50% run was
not conducted. Note the current inventory in Table 1 does
not match exactly with either the 1985 starting inventory
or the 1985 end strength of Table 5. The reason for this
discrepancy is that the model is accurate to the start
and end dates of FY 1985 and the Table 1 inventory was
accurate to manning levels on 23 May 1985, the date the
data for Table 1 was collected.
The 0-1 and 0-2 levels remained constant for al
1
runs. The 0-3 level had a small increase due to the
increase in 0-3' s being passed over. The 0-4 level
decreased to within 3% of the target level. The 0-5
level decreased by 3% to 33% over manned. If the model
had been projected to FY 2000 a greater decrease would
have been realized. However, the inputs to STRAP-0 past
1991 would have little credibility. The 0-6 level remained
constant at 121% over manned.
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TABLE 5.
TOTAL END STRENGTHS BY GRADE
RUN RANK STINV 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 B I LT OVER %OVER
DEF 0-1 44 54 59 56 62 65 65 65
0-2 57 51 42 48 55 53 56 59 131 -7 -5%
0-3 106 114 115 114 112 115 108 109 170 -61 -36%
0-4 77 81 81 84 86 88 89 85 59 26 44%
0-5 41 40 45 48 50 54 56 57 42 15 36%
0-6 12 17 21 24 27 29 31 31 14 17 121%
TOT 337 357 363 374 392 404 405 406 416 -10 -2%
80% 0-1 44 54 59 56 62 65 65 65
0-2 57 51 42 48 55 53 56 59 131 -7 -5%
0-3 106 115 118 118 112 116 111 111 170 -59 -35%
0-4 77 80 78 78 82 83 81 78 59 19 32%
0-5 41 40 46 50 50 52 54 54 42 12 29%
0-6 12 17 20 23 26 31 33 31 14 17 121%
TOT 337 357 363 373 387 400 400 398 416 -18 -4%
70% 0-1 44 54 59 56 62 65 65 65
0-2 57 51 42 48 55 53 56 59 131 -7 -5%
0-3 106 117 122 121 117 118 113 113 170 -57 -34%
0-4 77 78 74 72 74 74 72 70 59 11 19%
0-5 41 40 45 48 49 53 57 57 42 15 36%
0-6 12 17 21 25 28 30 30 29 14 15 107%
TOT 337 357 363 370 385 393 393 393 416 -23 -6%
60% 0-1 44 54 59 56 62 65 65 65
0-2 57 51 42 48 55 53 56 59 131 -7 -5%
0-3 106 118 122 122 119 121 115 115 170 -55 -32%
0-4 77 77 73 70 69 66 62 61 59 2 3%
0-5 41 40 46 50 52 55 60 56 42 14 33%
0-6 12 17 20 23 26 31 31 31 14 17 121%
TOT 337 357 362 369 383 391 389 387 416 -29 -7%
Run = Per Cent of control of the promotion rate of 0-3 to 0-4
DEF = Default = 95% on the average to 0-4
STINV = Starting Inventory FY 1985
BILT = Authorized Billets 1990, 131 at 0-2 is for 0-1 + 0-2
OVER = # of personnel over al 1 owance in 1991
%0VER = % of personnel over allowance in 1991
TOT = Sum Total of the column for each run
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Table 6 is a summary of losses including laterals.
Losses at each rank are the sum of losses across all year
groups within a given rank. Laterals are primarily
individuals in the 0-1 and 0-2 level that fail to complete
Naval Special Warfare training. Other laterals are those
individuals that have changed to other URL or RL
designators (an insignificant number). The Department. Head
Screen has no effect on the 0-1 and 0-2 level. As expected
moving from default down to a 60% pass rate the Department
Head Screen increases losses in the 0-3 level. An
additional 23 (96-73=23) personnel were not advanced to 0-4
for the 1985 to 1991 period. Losses at the 0-4 level have
decreased by 8 (26-18=8) personnel, and the 0-5 and 0-6
levels were basically unaffected. The overall loss change
to the Naval Special Warfare community was an increased
loss of 15 (232-217=15) personnel.
Embedded in Table 6 are losses at the 0-3 level due
solely to not being selected for promotion to 0-4. Table 7
shows losses from the 0-3 rank due to being passed over for
selection as a result of failing the Naval Special Warfare
Department Head Screen. Where in Table 6 it appears that
the Department Head Screen caused an additional loss of
only 23 personnel Table 7 indicates that the additional
loss for this reason was 30 (41-11=30) Lieutenants. This
means that the Department Head Screen caused 7
[ ( 73- 1 1 ) - ( 96-41 ) =7 ] losses that would have occurred for
other reasons without the Department Head Screen.
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TABLE 6
SUMMARY OF LOSSES INCLUDING LATERALS
RUN RANK 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 TOT
DEF 0-1 4 7 7 7 8 9 9 51
0-2 9 7 6 4 5 6 5 42
0-3 5 8 10 10 12 15 13 73
0-4 4 4 2 1 3 6 6 26
0-5 1 2 1 3 5 12
0-6 1 1 1 2 4 4 13
TOT 22 27 27 25 31 43 42 217
80% 0-1 4 7 7 7 8 9 9 51
0-2 9 7 6 4 5 6 5 42
0-3 5 8 11 13 12 16 15 80
0-4 4 4 2 1 3 5 4 23
0-5 1 3 1 3 6 14
0-6 1 1 1 1 4 5 13
TOT 22 27 28 29 30 43 44 223
70% 0-1 4 7 7 7 8 9 9 51
0-2 9 7 6 4 5 6 5 42
0-3 5 9 14 13 15 17 17 89
0-4 4 3 2 3 4 3 19
0-5 1 3 2 2 5 13
0-6 1 1 1 2 5 4 14
TOT 22 27 31 28 35 40 42 228
60% 0-1 4 7 7 7 8 9 9 51
0-2 9 7 6 4 5 6 5 42
0-3 5 10 14 14 17 19 17 96
0-4 4 3 1 3 4 3 18
0-5 3 1 3 6 13
0-6 1 1 1 1 4 4 12
TOT 22 28 29 29 35 45 44 232
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TABLE 7
0-3 TO 0-4 ZONE SIZE, PROMOTIONS, AND LOSSES BY YG
RUN YEARS
DEF 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 TOT
ZONE 14 15 11 12 14 17 10
PROMOTED 12 14 10 10 12 15 9
LOSS 2 1 1 2 2 o 1 1 1
80%
ZONE 14 14 10 17 15 16 11
PROMOTED 11 11 8 12 11 12 8
LOSS 3 3 2 5 4 4 3 24
70%
ZONE 14 13 10 13 19 17 11
PROMOTED 9 9 7 8 12 11 7
LOSS 5 4 3 5 7 6 4 34
60%
ZONE 14 16 10 11 15 16 11
PROMOTED 8 9 6 6 8 9 6
LOSS 6 7 4 5 7 7 5 41
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Table 7 also gives the size of the promotion zone and the
number promoted. Note the size of the zone may be greater
or less than the year group size as the zone size is
determined by number of personnel in the year group, lineal
number, and billets available. The lineal number is a URL
officers seniority position relative to all other URL
of f i cers
.
Also note that STRAP-0 used the 60, 70, and 80 per cent
advancement rates to 0-4 as maximums and approached them
without exceeding them. This resulted in actual average
rates of 74% for the 80% run, 65% for the 70% run, and 56%
for the 60% run. These actual rates would have been much
closer to the desired rates had the promotion zones been
larger. However, with zone sizes of 10 to 19 personnel the
actual rates are acceptable and do not affect the validity
of the results.
Table 8 shows the accessions to the 0-1/0-2 level which
was constant for al 1 four runs.
Table 9 compares promotion opportunities to the 0-4,
0-5, and 0-6 levels for each run. Naturally, the rates
to the 0-4 level are the controlled pass rates. It also
compares them to the overall URL rates to the same ranks.
Table 9 answers the question; Does the Department
Head Screen affect promotion opportunities at the 0-5 and
0-6 levels? It does not. It can readily be seen from
Table 9 that the Department Head Screen would put Naval
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TABLE 8
ACCESSIONS INTO THE NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMUNITY
FY 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
# PERS 35 28 31 35 35 35 35
TABLE 9
PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES IN NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE
PERCENT BY RANK
RANK RUN 1985 1986 1987 1988 1988 1989 1990 1991
0-4 DEF 92 95 95 95 95 95 95 94
80% 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
70% 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
60% 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
URL 85 85 85 80 80 80 80 30
DEF 70 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
80% 70 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
70% 70 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
60% 70 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
URL 75 75 75 70 70 70 70 70
DEF 100 60 67 67 67 67 67 67
80% 100 60 67 67 67 67 67 67
70% 100 60 67 67 67 67 67 67
60% 100 60 67 67 67 67 67 67




Special Warfare below the URL average at the 0-4 level, and
with or without the screen the Naval Special Warfare 0-5
and 0-6 ranks are at a 15% (85-70=15) and 7% (67-60=7)
advantage to the URL respectively.
This chapter has shown that the STRAP-0 model confirms
NMPC-413D'S calculations that a Department Head Screen in
the Naval Special Warfare community will decrease the
number of Lieutenant Commanders to within 3% of the
authorized number of 0-4 billets. It also shows the cost
to accomplish this in manpower will be 41 careers.
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V. EVALUATION OF THE DEPARTMENT HEAD SCREEN
Up to this point the problem, an excess of 0-4's in
the Naval Special Warfare rank pyramid, has been defined.
The mission and officer structure of the Naval Special
Warfare Community has been presented. The Department Head
Screen has been laid out in detail. Response of the Naval
Special Warfare Community to the proposal has been given.
Confirmation of NMPC-413D's calculations that a Department
Head Screen in the Naval Special Warfare Community will
solve the problem has been provided by the STRAP-0 model.
This chapter will show the relationships between the
components, or subsystems (i.e., NSW mission, billets,
inventory, accessions, and readiness), to each other and
the system. The system, Naval Special Warfare, is a
subsystem of the operating Navy. Impact that the
Department Head Screen proposal may have will be presented,
conclusions will be drawn, and recommendations made.
A. THE SYSTEM, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE
In peacetime the output from Naval Special Warfare is
readiness to counter the perceived threat. In time of
war readiness becomes combat operations to eliminate the
threat. Figure 6 shows how readiness in Naval Special
Warfare is attained with respect to officer manning
levels. The meaning of readiness in this context is the






ACCESSIONS NSWS-->1 0-1/2 » 0-3 » 0-4 » 0-5 *
DHS- +
LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS
* = Promot i on
Loss. Thru 0-3 includes lateral transfers, discharges,
medical disabilities, and retirement of ex-en 1 i s teds
.
0-4 and above is composed of medical retirements
and retirements. Discharges, although possible, are
historically non-existent in NSW.
Fi gure 6.
Readiness attainment in the NSW Officer Community
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is assigned. Disregarded are the other essential aspects
of readiness (i.e., logistics, men, funds, training,
etc.) not germane to this effort.
The inputs to this system are mission and accessions.
Mission is a function of the perceived threat. Chapter
II. A. presents the current Naval Special Warfare mission
statement. The mission drives the billet structure and
creates the demand for a specified number of Naval Special
Warfare qualified officers at each rank. The inventory is
a result of the number of authorized billets, promotions,
losses, and accessions. How well the inventory matches the
billets determines the degree of readiness. The promotion
system is within the inventory in Figure 6. Promotions are
a result of: successful performance of NSW operations,
administrative abilities, passing any required screens,
serving in specific billets, attending schools, receiving
good Fitreps, and being selected by the Promotion Board.
Any requirement added to or subtracted from the promotion
system will have a bearing on readiness.
B. IMPACT TO THE NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMUNITY
The Department Head Screen will bring the number of
Lieutenant Commanders to within the authorized level. The
impact of this will be most noticeably felt by Lieutenants
that do not pass the Department Head Screen. Without
viable career alternatives it will cost 41 Naval Special
Warfare Lieutenants their careers by 1991. Given this the
question becomes: What will the effect of this loss be
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on readiness and accessions? As seen in Figure 6 if the
number of authorized billets are filled then readiness will
be attained.
If the authorized number of 0-4 billets are sufficient
to attain readiness then the loss of personnel that would
have filled excess 0-4 billets will not degrade readiness.
With a decrease in the number of Lieutenants to Lieutenant
Commander competition for the available 0-4 slots will
increase. Greater competition breeds greater efficiency
and better performance. Better more efficient performance
will then lead to a higher degree of readiness. CRef. 17]
With readiness assured will accessions be affected?
NMPC-413D reasons that the type of individual that is
attracted to Naval Special Warfare will not be affected
by a decrease of probability of advancement from 90% to
60% at the 0-3 to 0-4 level, and therefore, accessions
will not decrease. CRef. 18]
An alternative viewpoint has the Department Head
Screen cause a marked decrease in the number of available
accessions which leads to a greater shortage of 0-1 to
0-3 f s than is shown in Table 5. It also indicates a loss
of cohesiveness at the 0-3 level due to the increased
competition to the 0-4 level. The net result of these
actions is a decrease in readiness.
Unfortunately, neither point of view can be confirmed
with the available information: The actual outcome will
fall between the two extremes. Hopefully it will be
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closer to the positive projection. However, assuming no
decrease in readiness or accessions, what alternatives
are open to the Lieutenants that will fail the Department
Head Screen?
Officers that are not competitive in their own warfare
specialty (i.e., an officer that has failed a Department
Head Screen) will find no other community will accept them,
and they will be passed over. Under the Defense Officer
Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) regulations, there are
currently no other Naval career alternatives open to
Lieutenants that have been passed over twice, they must be
involuntarily discharged from the Navy in the year they
were passed over for the second time [Ref. 19: p. 133.
This means the function of the Department Head Screen
will be that of a pre-promot ion selection board and will
be faced with the same problem the selection board has.
That is the problem of determining the "best fitted", as
distinguished from "qualified". The Navy's standards for
the original commissioning of an officer are high.
Successfully completing Naval Special Warfare training is
even more selective. Most of the eligible candidates
for promotion have "good" to "outstanding" records, and
would be qualified for promotion; however, there are not
enough authorized billets to permit all "qualified"
officers to be selected. [Ref. 20: p. 5] In this instance
there will be 41 qualified non-selected officers. At a
time of scarce manpower resources it seems inconsistent to
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The Department Head Screen in Naval Special Warfare
will decrease 0-4's to the authorized number of billets,
but it will waste manpower in the process. It will waste
manpower because there are no alternative career paths
for the passed over members to pursue.
The decision making process in NMPC-413D and Naval
Special Warfare commands appears to have taken a micro
view of the problem. There is no overall coordinated plan
to eliminate the shortages at the 0-1 to 0-3 level, or
decrease the overage at the 0-5 and 0-6 levels (In the long
run, after 1991, there will be some decrease due to the
Depatrment Head Screen. ) and balance the Naval Special
Warfare community as a whole.
1 . Possible Options
The objective of this effort is not to present a
detailed manpower plan for the Naval Special Warfare
officer community. The following is presented only as a
rough example of an overall plan.
To decrease the shortage of 0-1 thru 0-3's without
increasing the 0-4 overage a Warrant Officer (W0)/ Limited
Duty Officer (LD0) program could be explored. In the past
W0 and LD0 bil lets have been talked about but discarded out
of fear that too many W0 and LDO's would clog the junior
officer ranks and prevent regular officers from making
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rank. Responsible, planned management of such a program
would be able to prevent a jam from occurring. It is this
writers opinion that enlisteds picked up with 8 to 12 years
of service would probably not want to put in sufficient
time over 20 years of service to attain the Lieutenant
Commander rank. This would fill out the junior officer
shortage and not effect the overage at the 0-4 and above
1 eve 1 s
.
The excess of 0-4's, 0-5's, and 0-6's can be
trimmed by the X0/ CO screens and decreased promotions.
This would certainly be disappointing to the individuals
involved, but sub-specialties and Material Professional
options would be available, or, worst case, forced
retirement at the 20, 26, and 30 year points respectively.
This worst case compared to involuntary discharge for
Lieutenants is the much lessor evil.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
The problem should be re-examined and a whole community
approach should be taken to shape the Naval Special Warfare
community into the authorized configuration. The plan
should be run through the STRAP-0 model to confirm
calculations and ensure compatibility with the rest of the
URL community and DOPMA constraints. Both Naval Special
Warfare Groups should be included in the formulation of the
plan. The resultant plan should be given strong support
from the top down during implementation. It should be
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explained so the most junior Ensign understands the system
and can develop a long range career plan.
The advantage of using a systems approach is that it
will create a Naval Special Warfare officer career path
that will be an optimum design as opposed to a disjointed
series of stop gap measures.
50
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Hansel 1, R.C., Officer Promotion Opportunity Within
The Navy Unrestricted Line 1973-1979 , M.S. Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,
1979.
2. Department of the Navy, Naval Military Personnel
Command, Ltr Ser: NMPC-413D, Concerning Officer
Personnel Actions, 28 June 1985.
3. Rowe, M. , The Structured Accession Planning System
For Of
f
icers (STRAP-Q) : A System For Accessing The
Feasibility OfNavy Officer Manpower Plans , NPRDC
SR 82-26, Navy Personnel Research And Development
Center, San Diego, CA, June 1982.
4. Naval Education and Training Command, NAVEDTRA
38013, U.S. Naval Special Warfare Training Handbook
,
January 1974.
5. Doherty, L. M., Trent, T., Bretton, G.E., Counter
Attrition In Basic Underwater Demo 1 i t i on/SEAL
Program: Selection And Training
,
NPRDDC SR 81-13,
Navy Personnel Research And Development Center,
San Diego, CA., March 1981.





7. Department of the Navy, Naval Military Personnel
Command, NMPC 413D, Personal Communication, 23 May
1985.
8. Department of the Navy, Naval Military Personnel
Command, NMPC 413D, Copy of a slide from a present-
ation on 1130 Officer Career Planning, September
1977.
9. Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group One, Memo,
Concerning 1130 Officer Career Planning, 4 August
1977.
10. Department of the Navy, Naval Military Personnel
Command, NMPC 413D, Personal Communication,
15 October 1985.
51
11. Department of the Navy, Naval Military Personnel





12. Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group One, Ltr,
Ser : Nl/865, Concerning Officer Personnel Actions,
16 September 1985.
13. Commanding Officer, SEAL Team FOUR, Memo, Concerning
Officer Personnel Actions, 27 July 1985.
14. Commanding Officer, SEAL Team TWO, Ltr 3000, Ser:
CO/697, Concerning Officer Personnel Actions,
1 August 1985.
15. Commanding Officer, SEAL Team SIX, Ltr 1300, Ser:
ST-6-ADMIN/158, Concerning Officer Personnel
Actions, 30 July 1985.
16. Commander, Special Boat Squadron TWO, Ltr 1300, Ser:
01-004/219, Concerning Officer Personnel Actions, 30
July 1985.
17. Chief of Staff Officer, Naval Special Warfare Group
One, Personal Communication, 21 August 1985.
18. Department of the Navy, Naval Military Personnnel
Command, NMPC 413D, Personal Communication, 22
August 1985.
19. Harms, J.H., "Navy Officer Promotion System - Past,
Present, and Future," unpublished, 1975.







No . Copi es
1. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5100
3. Chief Of Naval Operations (0P-114D)
Navy Department
Washington, D.C. 20350-2000
4. LCDR Mark H. Lepick
Department of Administrative Sciences (Code 54L1)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5100
5. Assoc. Professor Douglas E. Neil
Department Of Operations Research (Code 55 Ni)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5100
6. Assoc. Professor Thomas G. Swenson,




7. Commander, Naval Military Personnel (NMPC-413D)
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20370
8. CDR Burton D. Smith
SEAL Team FOUR
Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek
Norfolk, Virginia 23521
9. LT John F. Luksik Jr.
SDV-2










c.l The feasibility of
instituting a Depart-














institutingi a uepa »
3 2768 000 65375 2
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY^
